Patrols searching 3–5 miles (4.8–8.0 km) above the front during the first two days of May, however, encountered no major enemy force except at the I Corps left where ROKA 1st Division patrols found the KPA 8th Division deployed astride Route 1.
On 30 April Van Fleet had ordered intensive patrolling to locate and identify PVA/KPA formations as they continued to move out of contact.
Though the concentration of strength in the western and central areas left the remainder of the front comparatively thin, Van Fleet believed that the six ROK divisions in the east- the 5th and 7th in the right portion of the X Corps sector, the 9th and 3rd in the ROK III Corps sector, and the Capital and 11th in the ROK I Corps sector- could hold the line since opposing KPA forces were weak and since the terrain barriers of the higher Taebaek Mountains favored defense. In the left portion of the X Corps sector, the US 1st Marine Division and the US 2nd Infantry Division, less the bulk of the US 23rd Infantry Regiment in Corps' reserve, covered the Chuncheon-Hongch'on axis. IX Corps, its sector narrowed by a westward shift of its right boundary, now had the British 28th Brigade, US 24th Infantry Division, ROK 2nd Division, ROK 6th Division and US 7th Infantry Division west to east on the No-Name Line and the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (187th RCT) in reserve for defense against an enemy strike down or out of the Bukhan River valley. Deployed around Seoul, I Corps blocked the Uijongbu approach with the US 1st Cavalry and 25th Infantry Divisions and the ROK 1st Division on line and the US 3rd Infantry Division and British 29th Brigade in reserve. Judging the Uijongbu- Seoul, Bukhan River, and Chuncheon- Hongch'on corridors to be the most likely axes of enemy advance, he shifted forces by 4 May to place most of his strength and all US divisions in the western and central sectors and aligned the US I, IX and X Corps so that each was responsible for one of these avenues. On 20 May the UN launched a counterattack on the west of the front and the PVA/KPA began to withdraw after suffering heavy losses with the offensive coming to an end on 22 May.Įighth United States Army commander General James Van Fleet expected the PVA's next effort to come either in the west, as had the main force of the April attacks, or on his central front. By 19 May the PVA/KPA advance was losing momentum due to reinforcement of the UN forces, supply difficulties and mounting losses from UN air and artillery strikes. The attack was launched on and succeeded in swiftly pushing back the ROK I Corps which retreated in good order and III Corps which was routed, while the US 2nd Infantry Division to their left mounted a stronger defense before gradually giving up ground. Secondary attacks would be mounted by PVA and KPA forces across the entire front. The objective of the main effort was to sever the six Republic of Korea Army (ROK) divisions on the eastern front from the remainder of the US Eighth Army and annihilate them and the US 2nd Infantry Division. The attack took place across the entire front but with the main thrust below the Soyang River in the Taebaek Mountains. The Battle of the Soyang River was fought during the Korean War between United Nations Command (UN) and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) and Korean People's Army (KPA) during the Spring Offensive of April–May 1951.